This paper examines whether insiders use private information to time the exercises of their executive stock options. Before May 1991, insiders had to hold the stock acquired through option exercise for six months. Exercises from that regime precede signi¯cantly positive abnormal stock performance, suggesting the use of inside information to time exercises. By contrast, we¯nd little evidence of such timing since insiders have been able to sell acquired shares immediately. Now, such timing should show up as negative abnormal stock returns after option exercise. However, we¯nd negative stock performance only after exercises by top managers at small¯rms.
I. Introduction
The debate about the value of executive stock options has focused on features of these options that make them worth less than ordinary options, such as their forfeitability and nontransferability. However, other aspects of these options might enhance their value to the executive. In particular, the executive might have private information about the future price of the underlying stock. This paper examines whether corporate insiders use private information to time the exercises of their executive stock options.
1 Our sample includes virtually all reported insider exercises from 1984 to 1990 and from 1992 to 1995 . Prior to May 1991 had to hold the stock they acquired through option exercise for six months.
2 Wē nd that exercises from this regulatory regime precede signi¯cantly positive abnormal stock returns. This suggests that insiders timed exercises so that the subsequent forced investment in the stock coincided with favorable price performance.
By contrast, we¯nd little evidence of the use of inside information to time exercises since the removal of the holding restriction in May 1991. When insiders are free to sell the acquired shares immediately, the use of private information should manifest itself as negative abnormal stock price performance following option exercise. However, only in the subsample of exercises by top managers at small¯rms, a tiny fraction of the full sample, do we¯nd signi¯cantly negative post-exercise stock price performance. Otherwise, we¯nd no evidence of exercising on inside information in the current regulatory regime.
Using data from 1993 to 1995, Ofek and Yermack (2000) ¯nd that the typical manager sells virtually all shares acquired through option exercise. However, this by itself is not evidence that insiders exercise options because of private negative information about¯rm prospects. Exercising and selling could simply re°ect diversi¯cation or liquidity needs. Detecting the use of private information to time exercises requires an examination of post-exercise stock price performance.
We test for the presence of abnormal stock price performance following insider option exercises using the sample of all exercises from January 1984 to November 1995 that were reported to the SEC by December 1995. The removal of the six-month holding restriction in May 1991 changes the theoretical impact of private information on exercise decisions. Therefore, we separate exercises into two subsamples associated with the di®erent regulatory regimes, those from January 1984 to December 1990, and those from January 1992 to November 1995.
The sample is dominated by large and medium-sized¯rms, where seasoned option plans are most prevalent. In addition, option exercises tend to take place after large stock price increases. For these reasons, we adjust post-exercise stock returns for both size and momentum before drawing inferences about the use of inside information.
We begin by de¯ning an event at a given¯rm as a month with any insider exercise.
In the pre-1991 subperiod, when the six-month holding period was in e®ect, abnormal returns in the¯rst six months after an exercise month average a signi¯cant 24 basis points per month. However, in the post-1991 subperiod, abnormal returns after insider option exercises are insigni¯cant.
Then we construct subsamples of exercises based on¯rm size and insider position.
We also restrict the sample to include only non-dividend-related exercises or months with a large number of di®erent insiders exercising. In general, the subsample results vary in the direction anticipated. For example, exercises at smaller¯rms and among higher-ranked insiders seem slightly better timed, that is, they precede higher returns in the pre-1991 subperiod and lower returns post-1991. However, for the most part, the results remain qualitatively the same as the full sample: post-exercise abnormal returns are positive in the pre-1991 subperiod and insigni¯cant post-1991. Only when we restrict the sample to top managers at small¯rms do we¯nd signi¯cantly negative abnormal returns in the post-1991 regulatory regime.
We give two reasons for the general non-informativeness of insider exercises in the post-1991 regulatory regime. First, the sample consists almost entirely of large and medium-sized¯rms, where insiders' informational advantages are likely to be weakest.
Indeed, studies of ordinary insider purchases and sales, such as Seyhun (1986 Seyhun ( , 1998 and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) ,¯nd trades at larger¯rms to be less informative than trades at smaller¯rms.
Second, now that insiders can sell the acquired shares immediately, option exercises are like sales in that they are transactions that allow insiders to reduce their exposure to their¯rms' stock. Given insiders' tendency to accumulate stock and options through compensation, insider sales and exercises may be driven mainly by diversi¯cation or liquidity needs. Recent evidence on sales supports this idea. Seyhun (1998) ¯nds that sales are less informative than purchases and that the pro¯tability of sales declined in the 1990s. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2000) nd that insider sales are generally not informative at all. Our results suggest that, like sales, option exercises in the current regulatory regime take place primarily for noninformational reasons. We conclude that, except in the case of top managers at small¯rms, insiders' potential information advantage in timing exercises is not an important issue in valuing executive stock options.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews literature on stock price performance surrounding insider transactions. Section III examines the theoretical impact of private information on exercise decisions. Section IV describes the data and Section V describes the methodology. Section VI presents the empirical results. Section VII concludes.
II. Previous research
Most studies of stock price performance surrounding insider transactions focus on ordinary purchases and sales of stock. Studies such as Lorie and Niederho®er (1968) , Ja®e (1974 ), and Seyhun (1986 , 1992 ¯nd positive abnormal performance after purchases and negative abnormal performance after sales. In addition, Seyhun (1986 Seyhun ( , 1998 ¯nds that insider trades are more pro¯table the smaller the¯rm and the closer the insider to top management. More recently, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2000) , who control for size and book-to-market e®ects in measuring abnormal performance,¯nd that insider sales are generally not informative. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) also¯nd that although insider trades at small¯rms are informative, insider trades at large¯rms are not.
A few studies of insider trading examine stock price performance surrounding option-related transactions. Seyhun (1998) ¯nds that after insider exercises of call options, returns net of the equal-weighted market portfolio are slightly positive during the period 1975 to 1994 but slightly negative if the sample is restricted to top executive exercises after May 1991. Seyhun (1998) also¯nds that net stock returns following insider put exercises are signi¯cantly positive. Huddart and Lang (1996) ¯nd that the fraction of options from a given grant that are exercised in a given month is positively related to prior stock price performance and unrelated to subsequent stock price performance. Yermack (1997) studies option grants and concludes that boards of directors, possibly under in°uence from CEOs, time grants to top managers so that they precede positive stock price performance.
III. The impact of information on exercise decisions
Since May 1991, insiders exercising executive stock options have been free to sell the acquired stock immediately. The main purpose of this section is to establish that in this regime the use of inside information to time exercises should show up empirically as negative post-exercise abnormal returns. In particular, we wish to refute a tax-based argument to the contrary.
A call option represents a long position in the underlying stock. If the option holder receives bad news about the future stock price, he may wish to reduce this position. If the option is nontransferable, then exercising the option and selling the acquired stock is the only way to reduce the position. Therefore, private negative information can trigger an exercise.
Some argue on the other hand that if the executive expects the stock price to rise over the coming year, he should exercise and hold the stock, because income from the option payo® is taxed at a higher rate than capital gains on stock holdings. We show that this tax-based argument for exercising prior to positive stock performance is not valid. In particular, if the executive expects the stock price to rise su±ciently, he is better o® holding the option and buying additional stock with the money that he would otherwise have to pay to exercise the option, namely, the strike price and the tax on the existing option pro¯t. More precisely, in the Appendix, we prove the following:
Proposition Suppose an executive holding an in-the-money nontransferable option knows the future one-year stock return with certainty. Suppose the executive can exercise the option today or in one year and can also invest in stock and bonds. Finally, suppose the executive chooses an exercise and investment policy to maximize his endof-year payo®. Then there exists a critical value such that, if his stock price forecast is above the critical value, the executive holds the option, and if his forecast is below the critical value, he exercises the option.
The critical value of the stock price forecast, at which the optimal exercise decision changes, depends on the strike price, the interest rate, the dividend rate, and the tax rates. Nevertheless, for any con¯guration of these parameters, as the future stock price forecast ranges from favorable to unfavorable, the optimal exercise decision switches from holding the option to exercising it. A model of the executive's optimal exercise policy with a binomial stock price, available from the authors, delivers the same basic result. The essential implications of the models are:
1. Private bad news about the future stock return may or may not trigger an exercise of a nontransferable option. Small downward revisions in the executive's stock price forecast may not push him into the exercise region, but large ones will.
2. Private good news cannot trigger an exercise. Upward revisions in the executive's forecast can only move him farther from the exercise region.
Statistical tests of insider trading examine abnormal returns, not total returns. Although the models described above do not distinguish between abnormal and total returns, because they do not incorporate multiple risky assets, they still illustrate the essential information e®ect: private information can trigger an option exercise only if it reduces the insider's desired exposure to the stock. Since an insider's private information is typically speci¯c to his¯rm, it tends to be information about the stock's abnormal return. Furthermore, portfolio theory indicates that it is news about abnor-mal return that changes desired holdings. Therefore, the use of inside information to time exercises should show up as negative post-exercise abnormal returns.
Of course, exercises can also take place for reasons unrelated to private information. Insiders' natural long position in their¯rms through stock-based compensation and human capital should precipitate option exercises and stock sales purely to meet diversi¯cation and liquidity needs. Noninformational events such as dividend payments, employment termination, and option expiration can also trigger exercises. Therefore, the average information content of insider option exercises is an empirical question.
Information and exercises prior to May 1991
Prior to May 1991, the SEC required insiders to hold the stock acquired through exercise for six months. In the presence of this holding restriction, the impact of new information on exercise decisions is not obvious. News suggesting that the stock price is entering into a long slow decline might cause the holder of a deep-in-the-money option to exercise in order to get through the holding period and still capture some of the option pro¯t. On the other hand, good news about the future stock return might make an option holder exercise because it makes him more willing to endure the holding period. This latter information e®ect would generate positive post-exercise stock performance.
IV. Data
The data set consists of all option exercises by corporate insiders that took place Our data do not indicate whether the shares acquired through option exercise were held or sold. However, this is not likely to be a problem because Ofek and Yermack (2000) ¯nd that in this regime, almost all executives sell the shares acquired through option exercise. In addition, we are unable to eliminate exercises triggered by option expiration because expiration dates are not publicly available in electronic form. Again, however, we do not believe this is a problem. Using proprietary data on option exercises from 1985 to 1995, Huddart and Lang (1996) ¯nd that most exercises occur well before expiration.
Figures 1a and 1b plot the number of¯rms with insider exercises in each month of the¯rst and second subperiods, respectively. The¯gures show that exercise¯lings are more frequent during the post-1991 regime. This may be because compliance with SEC rules has improved with the new regulation, because option grants have increased over time, or because strong stock market performance put more options in the money.
Another possibility is that the holding restriction of the¯rst regime lead more insiders to exercise tandem stock appreciation rights and get the option payo® in cash rather than exercise options outright.
At the monthly level,¯gures 1a and 1b show that year-end months tend to be peak exercise times, probably for tax-timing reasons. December 1992 has the greatest number of exercises, re°ecting attempts to recognize option income before the tax increase of 1993. In recent years, a quarterly pattern emerges with peaks in February, May, August, and November. This may be associated with the growth in corporate restrictions that limit insider trading to windows of time after quarterly earnings announcements (see Jeng (1998) and Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) ).
Figures 1a and 1b also show the size composition of the sample¯rms. \Small" rms are those in the bottom three CRSP size deciles, \medium"¯rms are those in the middle four size deciles, and \large"¯rms are those in the top three size deciles. Thē gures show that the sample is heavily weighted towards large and medium-sized¯rms.
In an average month, 67% of the¯rms with insider exercises are large, while only 6% are small. The scarcity of small¯rms in our sample is consistent with insider trading patterns documented elsewhere. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) ¯nd that, although the frequency of ordinary insider purchases is fairly similar across¯rms of di®erent size, insider sales and option exercises are much more frequent at larger¯rms. Seyhun (1998) also¯nds that sell months are more frequent at larger¯rms. This seems to be because seasoned option compensation plans, which precipitate exercises and sales, are more prevalent at larger¯rms during this time period.
V. Methodology
To address the question of whether insiders use private information to time their option exercises, we test for the presence of abnormal post-exercise stock price performance.
In each subperiod, pre-1991 and post-1991, we examine stock price performance over periods ranging from one day to one year after the exercise. We also ask whether the removal of the holding restriction on acquired stock altered insiders' exercise strategies by testing for a di®erence in post-exercise stock price performance across the two regulatory regimes.
A. Measuring abnormal performance
We measure a¯rm's abnormal return as the deviation of its return from the return on a benchmark portfolio of¯rms with similar characteristics. Our sample¯rms are unusual in two respects. First, they are almost all large and medium-sized¯rms. Second, as we document in Section VI, they experience signi¯cant stock price increases prior to the event. We control for both of these characteristics.
decile portfolios as benchmarks. Adjusting returns for size is widely used as a method for measuring abnormal performance (see, for example, Desai and Jain (1995), Loughran and Ritter (1995) , or Michaely and Womack (1998) ). The approach is founded on considerable evidence that¯rm size is important in explaining cross-sectional di®erences in expected stock returns (see, for example, Fama and French (1992) ) and has formal theoretical justi¯cation as well (see Berk (1995) ).
However, before we draw inferences about the use of inside information to time exercises, we also control for¯rms' extraordinary pre-exercise stock price performance.
Several papers¯nd a \momentum" e®ect in stock returns in the time period of this study (see, for example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) , Fama and French (1996) , and Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) ): over short horizons, stocks that have done well in the past outperform stocks that have done poorly. Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) ¯nd that in random samples of¯rms with good pre-event returns, tests for abnormal performance that do not control for momentum over-reject the null hypothesis of no abnormal post-event performance in favor of positive performance. Therefore, we base our conclusions on size-momentum-adjusted returns using a set of¯fty benchmark portfolios of stocks in di®erent size deciles and momentum quintiles. Following
Carhart (1997), we de¯ne momentum for a¯rm in month t as its compound return over months t-12 through t-2.
B. Assessing signi¯cance
Option exercises are frequent events, so post-event periods overlap in calendar time.
Therefore, a cross-sectional t-statistic that treats the post-event abnormal returns as independent is inappropriate. Instead, we assess statistical signi¯cance using the calendar time portfolio method recommended by Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) . Ja®e (1974), Mandelker (1974) , and more recently, Loughran and Ritter (1995) , Brav and Gompers (1997) , and Mitchell and Sta®ord (1997) all use variations of this approach.
For any given event period of interest, we create a calendar time series of the average abnormal return on a portfolio of the¯rms that are in the speci¯ed event period. For example, if the period of interest is months 1 through 6 of event time, then each calendar month, the event portfolio contains all¯rms with an option exercise in the preceding six calendar months. From this calendar time series, we compute the mean abnormal return, its standard error, and a t-statistic.
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VI. Results
We begin by analyzing abnormal performance surrounding exercise events using the full sample of option exercises in Section A. Then we examine post-exercise performance for various subsamples in Section B. Section C discusses the results.
A. Results for the full sample
We present returns adjusted for size in Section 1 and for both size and momentum in Section 2. Each section starts by examining stock performance over long event periods,
with an event at a given¯rm de¯ned as a month with at least one insider exercise.
Then we look at performance in the days immediately surrounding exercises, de¯ning an event as a day with an insider exercise. Figure 2 plots the cumulative average monthly size-adjusted return from month ¡120 to 12.
Returns adjusted for size
Prior to option exercises, stock prices rise dramatically. Size-adjusted returns in the year before an exercise month average 1% per month during the pre-1991 subperiod and 1.6% per month during the post-1991 subperiod. The t-statistics for each of months ¡12 to ¡1 range from 7.58 to 15.62. Table 1 also shows the t-statistics for di®erences in regime means. The pre-exercise abnormal returns are signi¯cantly higher in the post-1991 regime than in the pre-1991 regime.
That exercises tend to take place after strong stock price performance is not surprising. It is consistent with insiders following an exercise policy that calls for exercising once the stock price rises su±ciently high and does not provide any evidence regard-ing the use of private information. Testing for private information trading involves examining stock price performance after the option exercise.
After option exercise, size-adjusted stock returns diminish substantially, but remain positive. In the pre-1991 subperiod, when the six-month holding restriction on acquired shares was in e®ect, the mean monthly abnormal return for event months 1 through 6
is 35 basis points with a t-statistic of 3.39. In months 7 through 12, after the holding period expires, the mean abnormal return falls to 18 basis points per month, with a t-statistic of 1.73. In the post-1991 subperiod, which has no holding restriction, mean size-adjusted returns after exercises are positive but smaller. Only in month 1 is the mean abnormal return signi¯cant, 31 basis points with a t-statistic of 2.18. Table 2 and¯gure 3 describe stock price performance over the trading 40 days surrounding the exercise day. The daily stock return pattern is similar to the monthly:
a striking run-up prior to exercise, especially in the second regime, that°attens out after exercise. Prior to the exercise, the average daily abnormal stock return reaches 13 basis points on day -1 in the pre-1991 subperiod, and 30 basis points on day -1 in the post-1991 subperiod. Again, pre-exercise abnormal returns in the post-1991 subperiod are signi¯cantly higher than in the pre-1991 subperiod. After the option exercise, sizeadjusted returns remain signi¯cantly positive, an average of 4 basis points per day in the twenty days after the exercise day.
Returns adjusted for size and momentum
With such strong pre-exercise stock price performance, controlling for a momentum e®ect in post-exercise performance is imperative. The control is especially important for the post-1991 subperiod where the pre-exercise performance is stronger. Table 3 presents monthly returns adjusted for both size and momentum in the year after an exercise month. Table 4 presents daily size-momentum-adjusted returns in the 20 days after an exercise day.
Controlling for momentum generally reduces the magnitudes of the abnormal returns, but in the pre-1991 regulatory regime they remain signi¯cantly positive. For example, in the pre-1991 subperiod, the average abnormal return in months 1 to 6 falls from 35 to 24 basis points per month but is still signi¯cant with a t-statistic of 2.88.
The average abnormal return in days 1 to 20 falls from 4 to 2 basis points per day but is still signi¯cant with a t-statistic of 5.14.
In the post-1991 regulatory regime, however, controlling for momentum removes virtually all positive abnormal performance of¯rms after an option exercise. Using the size-momentum benchmarks reduces the mean month 1 abnormal return in the post-1991 subperiod from 31 to 13 basis points and the corresponding t-statistic from 2.18 to 1.21. The mean daily return for days 1 to 20 falls from 4 to 1 basis point per day and its t-statistic falls from 4.64 to 1.01.
B. Results for various subsamples
The full sample results suggest that in the pre-1991 regulatory regime, insiders used private information to time option exercises so that the resulting six-month investment in the underlying shares coincided with a period of favorable stock price performance.
However, the post-1991 results for the full sample provide no evidence that insiders use private information to exercise in advance of poor stock price performance now that they are free to sell the underlying shares immediately. To investigate this¯nding, this section studies subsamples designed to isolate option exercises most likely to re°ect the use of private information. First we examine subsamples of exercises grouped by¯rm size or insider position. Then we restrict the sample to non-dividend-related exercises.
Finally, we look at¯rm months with widespread exercising. The remainder of this section describes each subsample and table 5 contains the main results.
Subsamples based on¯rm size
Insider trading may be more pro¯table at smaller¯rms where the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders may be greater and where a given piece of information may have greater impact on the market value of the¯rm as a whole. Studies of ordinary insider stock purchases and sales, such as Seyhun (1986 Seyhun ( , 1998 and Lakonishok and Lee (2001),¯nd that insider trading is more informative at smaller¯rms. 
Subsamples based on insider position
Higher-ranked insiders might have better information about the prospects of the¯rm.
For instance, Seyhun (1998) ¯nds that ordinary stock sales and purchases by top executives are more pro¯table than those of other insiders. Rows 5, 6, 7, and 8 of table 5 present post-exercise abnormal returns for four classes of insiders: top managers, de¯ned as¯rm presidents and board chairmen, o±cers, directors who are not also ofcers, and large shareholders who are not also o±cers or directors. Again, the results vary with insider position in the way we might expect: exercises by higher-ranked insiders precede higher abnormal returns in the pre-1991 subperiod and lower abnormal returns in the post-1991 subperiod. Unlike the pre-1991 results for the full sample, the pre-1991 post-exercise abnormal returns for large shareholders are insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero. Otherwise, however, the results remain qualitatively the same as those for the full sample. In particular, even top manager exercises do not precede signi¯cantly negative abnormal returns in the post-1991 subperiod.
Exercises by top managers at small¯rms
Next, we examine size-momentum-adjusted returns in the six months following an insider exercise for all twelve¯rm size-insider position subsamples. For all but one subsample, the abnormal returns in the post-1991 regime are insigni¯cant. In the small¯rm-top manager subsample, however, the results are dramatic. This is exactly where we would expect to see the largest post-exercise abnormal returns, because this is where insiders' information advantage is likely to be greatest, and the evidence con¯rms this prediction. As row 9 of table 5 shows, in the six months after these exercises, mean abnormal returns are 120 basis points per month during the pre-1991 subperiod and -87 basis points during the post-1991 subperiod. The negative mean abnormal return in the post-1991 subperiod is signi¯cant, with a t-statistic of -2.45.
Non-dividend-related exercises
One noninformational reason to exercise an option early is to capture the value of a dividend. We de¯ne non-dividend-related exercises as those which do not fall between a dividend announcement date and an ex-dividend date. Row 10 of table 5 describes abnormal returns following months with at least one non-dividend-related exercise.
The results are virtually the same as those for the full sample. We also¯nd that restricting the¯rm size-insider position subsamples to non-dividend related exercises has little e®ect.
Months with many insiders exercising
Private information about¯rm prospects could be a reason for widespread exercising, as opposed reasons such as liquidity needs which might be independent across di®erent executives. This subsample includes only¯rm months in which the number of di®erent insiders exercising is unusually high. Di®erent¯rms have di®erent numbers of insiders and option programs of varying depths. In identifying a month with intense activity at a given¯rm we wish to take into account the normal level for that¯rm as well as seasonal patterns in the data. We use a simple approach. We¯rst eliminate December and January exercises, many of which may be motivated by tax timing. For each remaining month, we compare the number of di®erent insiders exercising to the average number of insiders exercising in each of the three previous months on the same quarterly cycle. If the number of insiders exercising in a given month exceeds the past average, that month is classi¯ed as having high activity, or widespread exercising. The results for these high activity months appear in row 11 of table 5. Again, the restriction makes a di®erence in the direction anticipated, but the e®ect is slight. Post-exercise excess returns in the second regime remain insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero.
C. Discussion
Requirements to hold stock for six months after option exercise appear to have lead insiders to time option exercises so that they preceded favorable stock price performance.
In the pre-1991 subperiod, size-momentum-adjusted returns over the six months after exercise are signi¯cantly positive for the full sample and most of the subsamples. They are also greater than the corresponding post-1991 returns at marginal signi¯cance levels in the full sample and at conventional signi¯cance levels in the small-¯rm and higher-ranked-insider subsamples.
The results do not however indicate a pervasive use of inside information to time exercises now that insiders are free to sell acquired shares immediately. When immediate stock sale is possible, call option exercises are like sales in the sense that they are transactions that allow an insider to reduce his exposure to the¯rm's stock return. For this reason, the use of private information should manifest itself as negative abnormal stock price performance after exercises. Yet only in the subsample of exercises by top managers at small¯rms, a tiny fraction of the full sample, are size-momentum-adjusted returns signi¯cantly negative in the post-1991 subperiod.
The general non-informativeness of exercises during the period 1992 to 1995 may seem somewhat puzzling given that numerous studies¯nd ordinary insider transactions to be abnormally pro¯table. However, the result is not entirely surprising given the striking size composition of the sample. The sample consists almost entirely of large and medium-sized¯rms where studies of ordinary purchases and sales¯nd insider trades to be the least informative.
The general absence of negative stock price performance following insider exercises from the post-1991 subperiod is also consistent with recent evidence on insider sales. Insiders accumulate large holdings of stock and call options through their compensation.
Therefore, option exercise and sales may be driven mainly by liquidity and portfolio rebalancing needs unrelated to private information. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2000) ¯nd that insider sales are generally not informative. Our evidence suggests that, like sales, option exercises take place primarily for noninformational reasons. Only where the insider's information advantage is greatest do we¯nd evidence of trading on inside information.
VII. Conclusion
This paper studies the information content of insider option exercises. Prior to May 1991, the SEC required insiders to hold acquired shares for six months after option exercise. We¯nd that exercises from 1984 to 1990 precede signi¯cantly positive abnormal returns. This suggests that when exercising an option entailed a mandatory six month investment in the stock, insiders used private information to exercise before good stock price performance.
In May 1991, the SEC removed the holding period restriction. We show that if the executive can sell the acquired shares immediately after exercise, bad news can trigger an option exercise but good news cannot, even when income tax rates exceed capital gains tax rates. This implies that after May 1991, the use of private information should manifest itself as negative post-exercise abnormal performance.
Empirically, we¯nd that during the period 1992 to 1995, abnormal returns after exercises by top managers at small¯rms are signi¯cantly negative. Otherwise, how-ever, we¯nd no evidence of the use of inside information to time option exercises. We o®er two reasons for this general non-informativeness of insider exercises. First, the sample consists almost entirely of large and medium-sized¯rms, where insiders' information advantages are the weakest. Second, now that insiders can sell the acquired shares immediately, exercises are like sales, which appear to take place primarily for diversi¯cation and liquidity purposes unrelated to private information.
Our results suggest that compensation committees at small¯rms granting options to top managers may wish to take into account the possibility that informational advantages increase the value of the options to the managers. In most cases, however, asymmetric information does not appear to be an important concern for the valuation of executive stock options.
Appendix: Proof of proposition
Without loss of generality, assume that the current stock price is one and the executive has just one option. Let k = strike price of the options, 0 < k < 1;
¿ c = capital gains tax rate, 0 · ¿ c < 1 r = after-tax interest rate,r > 0 ± = after-tax dividend rate,±¸0 and 1 + r s = future stock price:
For example, if interest and dividends are taxable as income, thenr = r(1 ¡ ¿ i ) and
where r and ± are the pre-tax interest rate and dividend rate.
If the executive exercises the option today, he gets (1 ¡ ¿ i )(1 ¡ k) after taxes. If he waits until the end of the year, he will get (1 ¡ ¿ i )(1 + r s ¡ k) + . The implied after-tax rate of return from leaving the option alive, instead of exercising it, is
Compare this to the after-tax returns of the stock and the bond. The after-tax bond return isr. The after-tax stock return is r s (1 ¡ ¿ c ) +±. We assume for expositional purposes that the capital gains tax applies symmetrically to gains and losses. The result is the same if the capital gains tax applies only to positive gains.
The executive chooses to exercise the option or not according to which action maximizes his future payo®. If the after-tax option return exceeds both the stock and bond returns then leaving the option alive yields the greatest future payo®. If the return on either the stock or the bond exceeds the option return, then the executive's best strategy is to exercise the option and invest the after-tax pro¯t in the asset with the greater return. The question of which return is greatest depends on the level of the future stock price. It also depends on the values of the other parameters. Let
If r 
Leave option alive if r s¸b2 :
( 
Leave option alive if r s¸b1 :
In both con¯gurations of the parameters±;r; k, and ¿ c , the optimal exercise policy involves exercising only when the anticipated stock price 1 + r s lies below some critical level. 1 Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act de¯nes corporate insiders as o±cers, directors, and bene¯cial owners of more than 10% of equity.
2 In May 1991, the SEC changed the starting date of Section 16(b)'s six-month \short swing" holding period from the exercise date to the grant date of the option.
This change e®ectively eliminated the holding period restriction on shares acquired through exercise, because most option plans already require more than six months between grant and exercise. The SEC also changed the reporting deadline from ten days after the month of the exercise to the sooner of the deadline for the next stock transaction¯ling or 45 days after the end of the¯scal year of the exercise.
3 We also examine the alphas in monthly calendar time series regressions of event portfolio excess returns on the Fama and French (1993) market, size, and book-tomarket factors (we thank Ken French for these data). The event portfolio is rebalanced monthly to hold all¯rms that have had an insider exercise during a speci¯ed period of time relative to the rebalancing date. For virtually every post-event period speci¯ed, the signi¯cance of the portfolio's estimated three-factor alpha is the same as that of its mean size-adjusted return. Calendar time series means and t-statistics for monthly size-momentum-adjusted returns on event portfolios. Each event portfolio is rebalanced monthly to hold all¯rms with an event in the preceding six months. In the \Full sample," the event is a month with an insider exercise. The \Small¯rms," \Medium-sized¯rms," \Large¯rms," \Top managers," \O±cers," \Directors," \Large shareholders,"
and \Top managers at small¯rms" subsamples restrict the sample according to¯rm size or insider position. \Non-dividend-related" exercises are those that do not fall between a dividend announcement date and an ex-dividend date. In the \Many insiders exercising" subsample, the event is a month in which the number of insiders exercising exceeds the average of that in the previous three months on the same quarterly cycle and which is neither a December nor January. The 
